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BAR BRIEFS

Reliable studies show a decrease of about 2,000 in the number of
law students during the two years between 1928 and 1930. More
strict requirements of prelegal education account for part of this
decrease.

With the latest count (1930) showing between 15o,ooo and

i6o,ooo lawyers in the country, only 4,5oo new recruits are needed
annually to replace those who drop out. How to accomplish a curtailing of the number of new licenses issued annually, without being
ruthless, is a problem for bar organizations to work out. Certainly
it is the duty of the bar organizations to make every effort to keep
those not properly qualified through general education, adequate legal
training, and high-type moral standards from "preying" upon the
public.
We note from the Carnegie Foundation's annual review (930)
that "where a large measure of control has been retained by, or vested
in the courts" the elementary essentials of a sound bar admission
system are most likely to be found; where the legislature has prescribed
most of the details, admission systems "are in the more primitive
group."
MOVIES AND SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT
Paramount vs. U. S., 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 42, brings out some interesting facts as well as a plain statement of the meaning of the Sherman
Act. Paramount-Lasky, controlling about 6o per cent of the films exhibited in the U. S., and some others, which add about 38 per cent
more to the percentage total, had developed a contract with distributors and exhibitors after several years of experimentation. Among
other things it required arbitration of disputes. The claim was that
the contract, being the result of discussion and experimentation, was
a reasonable and normal regulation; that arbitration was well adapted
to the needs of the industry; and that the absence of complaints established the reasonable character of the contract. The Supreme Court
of the United States, however, said this, among other things: "In order
to establish violation of the Sherman Act it is not necessary to show
that the challenged arrangement suppresses all competition between the
parties or that the parties themselves are discontented with the arrangement. The interest of the public in the preservation of competition
is the primary consideration. The prohibitions of the statute cannot be
'evaded by good motives'. The law is its own measure of right and
wrong, of what it permits, or forbids, and the judgment of the courts
cannot be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of its policy
with the good intentions of parties, and it may be, of some good results."
WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS
The occasions are becoming more numerous when criticism of
our criminal procedure is levelled at some other object than the courts
or the lawyers. The latest coming to our attention is the editorial in
the April 6th issue of the Minneapolis Tribune, from which we quote
the first three paragraphs:
"The verdict in the Brothers case is a conspicuous example of
the irrational results so frequently attained by American juries. It
should be observed that this incomprehensible verdict is in no wise
blamable on the court but rests entirely on the jury.

